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"NO WORD IS AN ISLAND": TEXTUALISM AND
AESTHETICS IN AKHIL REED AMAR'S THE BILL OF
RIGHTS*
Robert Spoo**
Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction ("The Bill of Rights")1 probes three defining moments
of American constitutional history-two of them in the contested past and one in the restless present. The first two are the
performative acts of framing, in 1789 and 1868, respectively, of
the initial ten amendments and of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. For Amar, history is too
multivalent, and the Framers' text too loftily open-textured, for
simple answers to the vexed question of incorporation. The Bill
of Rights is, in one of Amar's controlling metaphors, an "alloy"
of majoritarian and individual rights, federalism and civil liberties, that admits of no facile or mechanical incorporation
against the states.2 The Fourteenth Amendment, in its turn, is
a complex text woven in response to a "complicated reality."3
Indeed, Amar sees history and text as related to each other in
richly homologous ways. This interrelation, which is perhaps
the overarching concern of his book, demands the interpreter's
most sensitive and nuanced ministrations. Historical insensitivity can lead to anachronism, a cardinal sin in Amar's hermeneutic theology.4 Textual recklessness can result in exegetical sole* The quotation in the title of this essay, "[n]o word is an island," is taken
from Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 443, 499 (1989).
** Associate Professor of English, University of Tulsa, and Editor-in-Chief, The
James Joyce Quarterly. B-A_, 1979, Lawrence University; Ph.D., 1986, Princeton University; Candidate for J.D., June 2000, Yale Law School.
1. AMIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
2. See AMAR, supra note 1, at xiv (referring to "[c]ertain alloyed provisions of
the original Bill-part citizen right, part state right-4that] may need to undergo
refinement and filtration before their citizen-right elements can be absorbed by the
Fourteenth Amendment").
3. Id. at 180.
4. See, e.g., id. at 401 (incorporating into the index entry for "Fairman, Charles"
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cism, a related, or perhaps correlated, blunder. The interpreter

of the Bill of Rights thus takes on a challenge and a responsibility: to fashion an adequate response to the problem of the
Framers' "alloy."
The performative act of interpretation in the present, whether by judge, scholar, or ordinary citizen, is a third defining
moment of constitutional history. This essay examines Amar's
contribution to this ever-unfolding moment: his interpretive
methodology and practice in The Bill of Rights. In particular, I
focus on his use of aesthetic criteria and strategies as supplements to constitutional argument. As a textualist with
presentist commitments to We the People's Constitution, Amar
is attentive to the plain--or what Justice Story called the
"fair"5 -meaning of the document's words. Yet, as a cunning
intratextualist and structuralist, Amar discovers ambitious
verbal and institutional relationships within the eight corners
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights that challenge even
as they enrich the plain meaning of the text. As an intertextualist and historian, he recognizes that text is rarely selfsufficient, that it often stands in need of resourceful supplementation. Ultimately, Amar's restless eclecticism makes him
something of a "hypertextualist" in the sense used by DigitalAge enthusiasts: He draws upon multiple interpretive media--or what Philip Bobbitt calls "archetypes" 6 -for each of his
acts of exegesis. History, text, structure and, less often and
more ambivalently, doctrine, combine to forge and temper a
strategy of "refined incorporation" which Amar holds to be the
interpreter's most satisfying response to the alloy of the Bill of
Rights.
This essay examines Amar's complexly "alloyed" project of
using text and history to interpret text and history. Part I
probes his own carefully chosen metaphors for this project, from
macrostructural figures of Creation and Reconstruction, to microstructural images for incorporation drawn from the language

the sub-entry, "anachronistic views of").
5. PHILIP

BOBBITT,

CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:

THEORY OF THE

CONSTITUTION

25

(1982) (quoting Justice Joseph Story's reference to "the fair meaning of the words of
the [Constitution's] text" in 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, § 407, at 391 n.1 (1st ed. 1833) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES]).
6. Id. at 7.
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of metallurgy. Part II focuses in detail on Amar's textualist
theory and practice, paying special attention to his strategy of
intratextualism. The category of the aesthetic looms large in
Amar's project, and one of the goals of this essay is to isolate
and weigh the value of aesthetic and literary criteria for constitutional argumentation. Part III, accordingly, explores similarities between Amar's exegetical strategies and those of the literary-critical school known as the New Criticism. Amar's attentiveness to holistic meanings, intratextual echoes, and semantic
nuances makes him something of a constitutional New Critic
and renders the Constitution under his scrutiny a "verbal icon"
of the type celebrated by that interpretive school.7 Although it
would be too much to say that Amar raises aesthetic response
to the level of an archetype of constitutional grammar-thus
adding a seventh mode to Bobbitt's typology-the language of
aesthetic pleasure and coherence plays an important role in
Amar's intratextualism. Aesthetic and historical argument interact richly in The Bill of Rights. The nature and validity of that
interaction are the chief focus of this essay.
I.

MACROSTRUCTURES OF MEANING: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION

Interpretive purpose pervades The Bill of Rights from the
most unadorned expository sentence to the loftiest rhetorical
figure. Polemical structures of meaning emerge early and insistently in the book-as soon, in fact, as the title of Part One,
"Creation," the first of many indications that the 1789 Bill of
Rights is to be regarded as an organic thing, the living product
of a collaboration. The Bill was, Amar says, "a creature of its
time."' That word "creature" points in at least two directions,
reminding us, on the one hand, that this document that seems
to accompany us so easily into the late twentieth century was
given its shape, or "created," in an unfamiliar past and, on the
other, that as a living "creature" the text has the potential to
change as we change. We are thus forewarned and reassured in

7. See generally WILLIAM K. WIMSATr & MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, THE VERBAL
ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY (1954); see also discussion infra Part

III.B.
8. AMAR, supra note 1, at 3.
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the same moment: Amar will require us to show a healthy
respect for the alien qualities of the past lest we forget that it
is an historical document that we are expounding and pitch
headlong into anachronism. At the same time, we can be confident that the expounded text will continue to answer to our
present concerns, that our efforts at historical-mindedness will
not plunge us into antiquarianism.9 In the trope of "Creation,"
Amar the textualist offers a glimpse of his ambitiously hybrid
methods and goals: Exegesis will call upon history to make a
plain-meaning text speak the more plainly and richly to present
purposes. The hint of paradox that lurks in this promise will
unfold itself more fully later on.
On the practical level of exegesis, "Creation" requires putting
"first things first."" We must remove our accustomed modern
"spectacles,"" which cause us to see the Bill of Rights almost
exclusively in terms of individual civil liberties, and re-focus on
the Bill's original majoritarian function as a bulwark against a
powerful and potentially self-dealing central government. "Reconstruction" is the second step in the corrective process. Like
"Creation," this term faces in two directions. On the one hand,
it refers to certain transforming historical events: the national
effort to restore the ex-Confederate states to civil government
and the legislative saga of framing and ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment. On the other, it points steadily to the interpretive
present: the job of taking these freshly re-historicized rights
and remodeling them in the individualizing spirit of "privileges
and immunities." This task of translation requires "not incorporating clauses mechanically but reconstructing rights." 2 Only
in this way can the textualist "Reconstruct the Creation vision.""

9. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY, in 5
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (Oscar Levy ed. & Adrian Collins
trans., 1909) (1874) (distinguishing among antiquarian, monumental, and critical conceptions of history).
10. "First Things First" is the title of Part I, Chapter One. AMAR, supra note 1,
at 3.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 254.
13. Id. at 59.
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A. Birth and Rebirth: The Lincoln Leitmotiv
Echoing the macrostructure of Creation and Reconstruction
are Amar's persistent metaphors of birth and rebirth, which he
uses to reinforce and vary the first dyad. He refers early on, for
example, to "the world that birthed the Bill,"'4 and later to the
men-James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry-"whose combined travails helped birth the Bill of Rights." 5
Congressman John Bingham, Amar says, was "the father of the
Bill's rebirth in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment," 6 and
it is only by the collective efforts of the "men and women" who
fought against the slave power that "our Bill of Rights was reborn."' 7
These obstetric images subtly remind us that, in addition to
its arch-heroes James Madison and John Bingham, The Bill of
Rights pays tribute implicitly and pervasively, though rarely by
name, to Abraham Lincoln, who serves throughout as a kind of
tutelary spirit of structure. Lincoln, too, pressed the paradox of
male childbearing in his Gettysburg Address: "Fourscore and
seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a
new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." 8 The slight shock of the
obstetric image prepares us for appreciating the strangeness of
the process that Lincoln describes: the founding of a nation on
the airy basis of an abstract proposition, a mere idea of equality. As Garry Wills notes, "[t]he act of bringing forth a new
nation conceived in liberty is always an intellectual act for Lincoln." 9 Moreover, the veiled pun on "nation," with its Latinate
ties to "natal" and "nativity," allows Lincoln to nudge forward

14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 158.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 294.
18. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in
LErrERS AND ADDRESSES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 289, 289 (1903). Amar self-consciously
echoes the Gettysburg Address at various points in The Bill of Rights. See, e.g.,
AMAR, supra note 1, at 110 ("The jury, as a local body, beautifully fit the localism of
the Revolutionary era; but some fourscore years later the Civil War brought the surrender of the banner of extreme localism to the freedom flag of Union.").
19. GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA
85 (1992).
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his birth metaphor on the witty authority of etymology, thus
paving the way for the resounding promise of a "new birth of
freedom" at the conclusion. 0
The pervasive ghostly presence of the Gettysburg Address in
The Bill of Rights quietly lends structure and authority to
Amar's own master narrative. Reduced to its simplest form,
that narrative declares: The birth of majoritarian rights in the
Bill was followed some eighty years later by their miraculous
rebirth as individual liberties from the same textual source.
The miracle, of course, is that a single text could bear such
different offspring at such antithetical moments in our nation's
history. The two sets of rights are thus fraternal twins in their
uncanny mix, or alloy, of sameness and difference. To give point
to this paradox, Amar subtly borrows from the anguished
theologizing of Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, transposing
its logic from the military and moral realm to the historical and
legal one. Where Lincoln asks his listeners to suppose that the
slave interest is an offense for which God sent the war as punishment and expiation,2 Amar points to the original Bill's
"quiet complicity with the original sin of slavery"2 and notes
that, in affirming the freedom and citizenship of all, the Reconstruction Framers "renounced the Slave Power and all its
works."2" Both narratives are profoundly redemptive. The
American nation fell prey early on to the original utilitarian sin
of enthralling the few to the many; a stiff-necked people persisted in this error beyond God's appointed time; social upheaval and war were given to cleanse the sin and make a new
start. As a textualist, of course, Amar anchors this story in the
words of the Bill itself; indeed, he is not far at times from
suggesting that the original Bill's words bore the taint of
majoritarian iniquity' just so long as the slave interest continued-this is one of the subtler nuances of "alloyed" amend-

20. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in
LETrERS AND ADDRESSES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 18, at 289, 290.
21. See Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in LErTERS
AND ADDRESSES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 18, at 316, 318.
22. AMAR, supra note 1, at 293.
23. Id. at 294.
24. For a discussion of the moral complicity of the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution's perpetuation of the slave power, see infra note 33 and accompanying
text.
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ments-and that those words required the Fourteenth Amendment to "refine" and cleanse them.
Amar can offer this textualist theology without risking infidelity to history. Rather, it was the anti-incorporationist scholar
Charles Fairman who showed himself to be "anachronistic" in
ignoring the import of John Bingham's constitutional faith and
the religious rhetoric with which that Congressman endeavored
to inspire his colleagues in the HouseY Amar adds that "Hugo
Black, not Charles Fairman, proved the more faithful historian,
for he understood-because he shared-the almost mystical
attachment to the Bill of Rights exemplified by John
Bingham."26 Here, reliable historiography consists not in detached skepticism but in participatory sympathy. The textualist
Black, choosing the faith of total incorporation over the
Laodicean hairsplitting of selectivity and the Pharisaical aridity
of fundamentalism, 7 could enter into the mind and spirit of
the Reconstruction Framers because he personally felt the urgency of their project. Thus, textualism, despite its presentist
tendencies, can meet history on its own terms through an
intersubjective hermeneutics' of the kind Amar practices in
fitting his language with the religious iconography of Bingham
and Lincoln. The textualist can gain access to an alien past by

25. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 191. In Part Two of The Bill of Rights, Amar
devotes considerable space to refuting the influential anti-incorporationist arguments
in Charles Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 1, at 197-206 (contesting
Fairman's theory that, since the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were virtually
silent on the question of incorporation, they could not have intended the Amendment
to incorporate the Bill of Rights).
26. AMAR, supra note 1, at 191.
27. I refer to William Brennan's "selective incorporation" model and Felix
Frankfurter's "fundamental fairness" doctrine. See id. at xiv.
28. By "intersubjective hermeneutics," I mean an approach to the search for historical truth that centers on notions of personal contact with the "mind" of the past.
Variously described as idealistic, hermeneutic, or existential historiography, and exemplified by Jules Michelet, Wilhelm Dilthey, Benedetto Croce, R.G. Collingwood, and
others, this approach is ultimately Romantic in tendency. See, e.g., R.G.
COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 219 (1946) ("If it is by historical thinking that
we re-think and so rediscover the thought of, Hammurabi or Solon, it is in the same
way that we discover the thought of a friend who writes us a letter, or a stranger
who crosses the street . . . ."); see also HAYDEN V. WHITE, Interpretation in History,
in TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 51, 79 n.30 (1978) (discussing "history as palingenesis," a resurrecting of the mind and personality of the past,
as practiced by Michelet and others).
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conforming his language sympathetically to the rhetorical forms
of that past. A time machine built of language is the vehicle of
choice for the text-oriented interpreter.
B. Controlling Metaphors:Alloys, Crucibles, and Filters
It is impossible to read The Bill of Rights and not be struck
by Amar's persistent use of metallurgic images to figure
textualist methodology. Ores, alloys, crucibles, and filters appear so frequently in Amar's theory and practice that these
images take on an explanatory life of their own and begin to
rival the redemptive story of Creation and Reconstruction as a
master narrative of methodology. Of course, Amar's expressive
metallurgy and his Lincolnesque theology are not wholly unrelated. One feature common to alloys and crucibles is the element of fire, and the retributive and purgatorial fires of the
Civil War often seem to be playing about the edges of Amar's
metaphors. Lincoln, himself, set the pattern for this range of
imagery, most famously in his description of the war as "It]he
fiery trial through which we pass."2 9 Something of Lincoln's
sense of fated and traumatic history seems to be echoed at
times in Amar's images of fire-forged and fire-tempered metals.
"Certain alloyed provisions of the original Bill-part citizen
right, part state right-may need to undergo refinement and
filtration," Amar says, "before their citizen-right elements can
be absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 0 At first blush it
seems odd, even infelicitous, to figure the original Bill as a
compound of alloys, a derivative substance. Something earthier
and pre-metallurgic would seem more fitting in the case of our
national "decalogue,"3 1 and indeed Amar occasionally does vary
the alloy metaphor, as in his reference to the "mixed ore in
which [citizen rights] are embedded in the 1789 Bill."3 2 Yet,
upon closer inspection, the alloy figure grows in aptness with
respect to both its primary referent-the challenging blend of
citizen rights and state rights originally fused into the Bill and

29. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 666, 688 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
30. AMAR, supra note 1, at xiv.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. at 222.
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rendered progressively confused by our preoccupation in this
century with individual rights-and its other connotations.
Certainly any document as thoroughly a product of partisan
concession and compromise as was the original Bill must be
regarded as a kind of political alloy or amalgam. One of those
compromises, I have suggested, is responsible for the faint pejorative sense of impurity or inferiority that "alloy" carries in
Amar's usage: In failing to address the evil of slavery that was
furtively installed in Articles I and IV of the Constitution,'
the Bill perpetuated the alloyed impurity and moral indecisiveness of the precursor document. The sins of the parent text
were visited upon its offspring.
Textualism is never far from history in The Bill of Rights,
and Amar's alloy metaphor straddles both forms of constitutional argument. Looked at from a textual point of view, the alloyed Bill poses a problem of translation: How can we best give
voice to what is "utterable" in an amendment at a given moment in history, to what can be heard and accepted within
prevailing norms of constitutional originality and validity?'
Furthermore, what will we find to be utterable in that moment:
structural, majoritarian values, or individual, minority truths?
If the particular truth we seek is not utterable, how may we
legitimately translate the intractable provision in order to convey that truth and make it enforceable in the courts of law and
conscience?

33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that each slave be counted as
three-fifths of a person for purposes of House representation); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1
(prohibiting Congress from interfering with slave importation until 1808); id. art. IV,
§ 2, cl. 3 (providing for the return of fugitive slaves); see also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS,
No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
19-20 (1986) (discussing the Constitution's slavery provisions in the light of the
nation's conflicted efforts "simultaneously to protect liberty and slavery").
34. I have taken the term "utterability" and the concept of translation from Lawrence Lessig. See Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingFederalism's Text, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1218, 1223 (1998) ("Sometimes [textualist] implications, in context, are unutterable. In these cases-where the plain text seems unutterable-utterability constrains the Court to find a different, and sometimes a more faithful, reading.") [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding]; see also Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 193 (arguing, in the context of federalism and the growth of the commerce power, that "to be faithful to the constitutional structure, the Court must be willing to be unfaithful to the constitutional text"
by translating the Framers' vision of limited federal power into the context of today)
[hereinafter Lessig, Translating].
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Viewed from the perspective of history, the alloyed text poses
the same question in a different idiom: How may we characterize an amendment in such a way as to avoid the pitfalls of
anachronism? If our obligation as historians is to historical
truth, is it not precisely the alloyed quality of the text-its
uneven mix of collectivist protections and private immunities,
its Janus-faced anxiety about the tyranny of government and
the will of an overweening majority-to which we must attend?
From the standpoint of purist historiography, our translations
of text must do more than merely avoid the appearance of extralegal political considerations; 5 they must respect the past's
heterogeneous, at times incoherent survival into the present. It
is possible to betray that heterogeneity by making too much
sense of it. The traduttore, as the old chestnut reminds us, can
quickly become a traditore. The imperatives of presentism can
undermine fidelity to the past.
The conscientious historian of the type just described dominates Part One of The Bill of Rights, and James Madison, the
consummate alloyed man,36 is the fitting symbol of that conscience. For Madison was a Federalist who recognized the danger posed by a strong central government to popular majorities;
yet he also drafted a constitutional amendment that would
place a check on the majoritarian aggressions of states, much
as the Fourteenth Amendment would later do.37 In his prescient inconsistencies," Madison was a dynamic blend of residual, dominant, and emergent forces of history; indeed, he can
be seen as the very personification of alloyed, heterogeneous

35. Lessig calls this the "Frankfurter constraint-the requirement that a reading
offer a rule that can be applied in context without 'appearing political." Lessig, Understanding, supra note 34, at 1224 (quoting Lessig, Translating, supra note 34, at
174).
36. In referring to Madison as the "alloyed man," I mean to make vivid the fact
that he embodied conflicting forces in history. This makes him an especially appropriate personification of the historical process itself, which Amar figures as complicated
and heterogeneous throughout The Bill of Rights, particularly in Part One.
37. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 143-44; see also id. at 237 (describing Madison's
dual "concern" with the agency problem of government and the factional problem of
tyrannous majorities).
38. See id. at 77 (describing Madison as "ahead of his time"); see also id. at 15960 (stressing that Madison was "a man ahead of his time"). To be ahead of his time
in Madison's case was not to be somehow outside or beyond history, but to be radically responsive to its complex interweavings of residual, dominant, and emergent
forces.
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history, a strange interweaving of the utterable and the unutterable (his failed Fourteenth Amendment having been deemed
unutterable by a majority of Congress).
Part Two of Amar's book is dominated by Congressman John
Bingham, who, in contrast to Madison, represents not alloyed
history but a kind of triumph over the complicated past in the
interests of zealous translation. Bingham actualized in the
Reconstruction Era what had remained merely a potential of
the Creation Era-the broad recognition of civil liberties-although "the conventional narrative uses Madison as an
anachronistic trope in lieu of Bingham."39 Bingham was the
expansive incorporationist and the true creator of a "Bill of
Rights," who oversaw the process by which individual privileges
would come to revise, or translate, the majoritarian accent of
the first ten amendments. Whereas the dominant exegetical
presence of Part One is the fastidious historiographer who
shuns anachronism ("first things first"), a different though related figure, that of the prudential textualist," comes to the
fore in Part Two. This is not to say that historical argument is
unimportant in Part Two; to the contrary, arguments from
history probably play a quantitatively greater role there than in
Part One. But the qualitative accent of Part Two seems to me
to be on text in translation, and the tireless, unalloyed
Bingham is the presiding spirit of that project.
When I say that the "prudential textualist" comes to dominate the second half of the book, I have in mind, for example,
Amar's pragmatic-sounding remark that "I have told a tale
that, at the end of the day, ends up supporting most of today's

39. Id. at 291.
40. By "prudential textualist" I mean a textualist who is prepared to make use of
prudentialist arguments when a text fails to yield a clear or complete meaning. See
BOBBrrT, supra note 5, at 61 (When there is "no text which states the priority to
give one [text] over others, there will be no textual argument that can resolve the
balance. It becomes then a matter of prudence, a calculation of the necessity of the
act against its costs."). Prudential arguments advance "particular doctrines according
to the practical wisdom of using the courts in a particular way." Id. at 7. I do not
mean to suggest that Amar ever strays far from textual-historical moorings, but rather that, in Part Two, a certain interpretive imperative-that of demonstrating almost
total incorporation-gives a prudential accent to his analyses. Since prudentialism is
a valid form of constitutional argumentation, see id. at 59-73, Amar's textual polemics
never become "ungrammatical."
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precedent about the Bill of Rights."4 This is only superficially
a doctrinal statement. Amar's point is that doctrine, taking its
own circuitous and often benighted way, has managed somehow
to wind up at the same destination as careful textual-historical
analysis, no, or little, thanks to judges: "[Clourts today have
ended up in pretty much the right place, even if they have not
always offered the best textual and historical reasons."4 2 These
are the confident words of the textualist who, having vindicated
Bingham and argued for the truth of near-total incorporation,
has carried the day against the professional contrarians.
How different tonally is the warning of the cautious historian
concerning the seductions of mechanical incorporation: "The
reality is, alas, more complicated."4 The sober, almost melancholy acknowledgment of the alloyed quality of history and text
sounds the Madisonian note discussed above. That sighed
"alas," however, glances at the Republican impatience of
Bingham, a restless mood that grows, and grows victorious,
throughout the balance of the book.
I do not wish to force the argument here, nor to categorize
Amar's strategies too rigidly according to archetypes. I speak of
perceived tendencies only, and it is my perception that history
plays a special foundational role in Part One, preparing the
way for the prudential textual-historical arguments of Part
Two. Historical complexity is faced squarely in Part One as a
prologue to translating that complexity in the interests of minority rights in Part Two. Or, to put the matter somewhat differently, and perhaps gnomically, Amar must formulate the
general epistemic problem of history as it is manifested in text
(the alloyed Bill) before he can use text (refined incorporation)
to address the specific pragmatic problem of countermajoritarian history.
The central textualist enterprise of Part Two is thus a deeply
principled one: the elaboration of a "refined model of incorporation" that tests a given provision of the Bill of Rights by asking
"whether it is a personal privilege-that is, a private right-of
individual citizens, rather than a right of states or the public at

41. AMAR, supra note 1, at 307.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 180.
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large."" Guided by the historical and textual implications of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause,
refined incorporation seeks to "synthesize the strengths" of
"Hugo Black's total incorporation model, William Brennan's
selective incorporation approach, and Felix Frankfurter's antiincorporationist emphasis on fundamental fairness.""
Amar characterizes this synthesis as an "alloy of the three
seemingly incompatible elements" or theories of incorporation
that "will prove far more attractive and durable than each
unalloyed component."' The alloy metaphor thus surfaces
again, but this time with a difference. For there is no hint here
of the pejorative sense of "alloy," the sense of metallic weakness
or impurity. Here the synthesizing textualist takes three metals, each of which is brittle and inferior in its own right, and
melts them down to forge a superior compound substance.4' In
this endeavor, the textualist has the fires of history on his side.
"Clause by clause, amendment by amendment, the Bill of
Rights was refined and strengthened in the crucible of the
1860s. Indeed, the very phrase bill of rights as a description of
the first ten (or nine, or eight) amendments was forged anew in
these years."' Abolitionism, war, assassination, Radical Republicanism, Reconstruction: These very real movements and events
prepared the crucible for the arduous process of incorporation.
The textualist, at his own more rarefied furnace, melts and
mixes the hermeneutic metals that will permit late-twentiethcentury scholars and jurists to perceive more clearly the meaning of that historical forging process of the 1860s."9

44. Id. at 221.
45. Id. at 214.
46. Id. at 140.
47. One reason why the total, selective, and fundamentalist models of incorporation are inferior metals is that each in its own way is abstract and conceptual,
lacking the tangible evidentiary basis that exists for the textualist approach (recorded
language) and the historical approach (recorded events).
48. AMAR, supra note 1, at 284.
49. Amar's efforts at refined incorporation complement not only the process of Reconstruction history generally, but also the specific efforts of Republican
Reconstructors. He argues, for example, with regard to Second Amendment incorporation: "Once we remember that, strictly speaking, 1860s Republicans sought not to
incorporate clauses but to apply (refined) rights against states, it seems rather natural textually that Reconstructors . . . invoked the operative rights clause of the Second Amendment while utterly ignoring its preambulatory ode to the militia." Id. at
259. Thus, the goal of incorporating individual privileges (arms-bearing) and of filter-
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Bingham's Privileges or Immunities Clause, precisely because
its language neither matches that of the original Bill nor even
refers directly to the Bill, is the proper equipment for absorbing
citizens' rights and filtering out states' rights. Where verbal
duplication would have led to judicial perplexity or paralysis,
asymmetry allows for differential incorporation and opens up
spaces for constructive choice.50 In its turn, Amar's apparatus
of refined incorporation seeks to repeat the differential function
of Bingham's language at the level of scholarly interpretation.
Thus, both scholarship and the judiciary can benefit from the
handy and flexible mechanism of refined incorporation, in contrast to the cumbrous machinery of substantive due process. In
various ways, then, Amar's project shows history and
textualism to be homologous and collaborative, the one a source
of ontological fact, the other an epistemic tool for recognizing
and weighing that fact and making it a legal reality.

II. TEXTUALISM IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Textualism is easier to sling about as a label than to employ
meaningfully in order to describe specific acts of constitutional
interpretation. The term probably has as many definitions as it
has definers. My present goal is not, in any case, to fix Amar
in a formulated phrase, as J. Alfred Prufrock might say, but
rather to see certain aspects of his textual practice in The Bill
of Rights steadily and whole. Inevitably, this means paying
scant attention to some aspects of that practice and altogether
ignoring instances of his textualism in other books and articles.
A. Plain Meanings and Recondite Meanings
In approaching Amar's textualism, we might begin with
something pre-textual and nonverbal such as a characteristic
gesture-his habit of producing a small booldet version of the

ing out collective rights (militia-enrollment) is one shared by Amar and Senator Jacob
Howard both-a further convergence of textualism and history.
50. See id. at 180 (noting that "[tihe wording of the Fourteenth Amendment is
remarkably sensitive to [the] complicated reality [of incorporation]," and reminding us
that the answer to such questions "will often be anything but mechanical, requiring
considerable judgment and hard choices").
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Constitution from a jacket pocket. Hugo Black, a noted
5
textualist precursor, was prone to the same gesture. This
expressive act attests to much more than a distrust of memory,
to which Black in fact confessed," or the quick-draw propensities of a man who would be right at ten paces in any constitutional dispute. Rather, the gesture says, in part: Behold, here is
"a text with four proverbial corners. It actually uses words like
'this Constitution' to describe itself as a document .... It is an
act, a doing, an ordainment and establishment, a constituting, a
constitution."53 Moreover, a constitution is a written act, and
"[w]ritten constitutionalism," as Jed Rubenfeld has remarked,
"is revolutionary."' At a minimum, Amar's gesture seems to
say that "[this] text itself is an obvious starting point of legal
analysis. 5 5
Were it not small and portable, the United States Constitution could not be whipped out of a pocket. Its language, too, is
56
portable in the sense that it is memorable and "lapidary."
But if we cannot always tuck the text away in our memories-and a culture that has the Internet and CD-ROM will
surely be tempted to forget about memory-we can fold a copy
of the text into a family Bible or photograph album, bind it into
the backs of dictionaries and history books, nail it to the walls
of schoolrooms and government buildings, or carry it in our
pockets. All of this, for Amar, means that this document ordained by "We the People" has profoundly and unavoidably to
do with "popular sovereignty and self-government over time."'
51. See BOBBITr, supra note 5, at 33 (describing an incident where Justice Black
"produc[ed] from his coat pocket a small copy of the Constitution" to answer a
reporter's questions).
52. See id.
53. Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and
Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1657, 1657 (1997). As Amar made these remarks, he
brandished his "handy-dandy pocket copy" of the Constitution. Id.
54. Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1085, 1105 (1998). Rubenfeld compares the writtenness of our Constitution to "the
speechmodeled ideal of self-government exemplified by the ancient Greek polis or the
New England town meeting." Id.; cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176
(1803) (noting that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written").
55. AMAR, supra note 1, at 296.
56. Amar, supra note 53, at 1658; cf. AMAR, supra note 1, at 195 ("Recall that
the Bill [of Rights] was in fact worded so that, like Scripture, it might be easily
memorized and internalized by ordinary Americans.").
57. Amar, supra note 53, at 1658; cf AMAR, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that
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The brevity and availability of the document ensure that we
the people will always be given notice of our most basic rights.
This idea of notice presupposes, in addition to writtenness
and physical accessibility, two fundamental textual conditions:
plain meaning and relevance to present concerns. Yet both of
these conditions are widely and vigorously debated by scholars
and jurists. The two concepts are mutually related in that any
text that is likely to remain relevant to present-day concerns
will probably be more or less intelligible to the common reader,
and its intelligibility will turn on its capacity to accommodate
contemporary issues and meanings, lexical and otherwise. Philip Bobbitt defines "textual argument" as the type of argument
"that is drawn from a consideration of the present sense of the
words of the provision," and he distinguishes textual from historical argument by noting that the latter "requires the consideration of evidence extrinsic to the text." ' Justice Joseph Story famously objected to Thomas Jefferson's preference for the
Framers' documented intent as a source for fixing constitutional
meaning by arguing that "there can be no security to the people
in any constitution of government if they are not to judge of it
by the fair meaning of the words of the text."59 Story packed
much of the textualist position into that brief riposte: the centrality of the people as interpreters, the necessity of notice, the
importance of present relevance and of plain, or "fair," meaning.
Plain meaning is indispensable to popular sovereignty; the
people "cannot be presumed," says Story, "to admit in [constitutions] any recondite meaning.""
Yet if popular constitutional government presupposes plain
meanings, the activities of judges and scholars exist in large
part because of recondite meanings. Quite plainly, constitutional
meanings are sometimes recondite, or at least seem so. Just as
plain meanings thrive on broad consensus as to present-day
"[tihe Preamble's dramatic opening words . . . trumpeted the Constitution's underlying
theory of popular sovereignty").
58. BOBBYIT, supra note 5, at 7.
59. Id. at 25 (quoting Justice Story in COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, § 407, at
391 n.1); cf Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175 (resting interpretation of the Supreme
Court's original and appellate jurisdiction on "the plain import of the words," "their
obvious meaning").
60. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 26 (quoting COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, § 451, at
437).
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lexical definitions, 61 recondite meanings are often the consequence of the passage of time. Meanings and intentions grow
obscure as their origins recede into the inaccessible or contested
past. If the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"62 is not
intuitively perspicuous to our late-twentieth-century understandings, this is probably because such offenses and their
requisite altitude in the context of public office are creatures of
the era of Blackstone and Lord Mansfield. We must perform
some kind of historical excavation to be sure of the meaning of
such a phrase, and if we have to excavate, the one thing we
can be fairly sure of is that we will never be entirely sure.
Rubenfeld argues that textualism, even when it seems most
concerned with the past, keeps its gaze fixed upon the present
because it is ultimately concerned with "the constitutional text
as a vehicle for the voice of the people."' The textualist's
originalism, says Rubenfeld, is not "Framers'-intent
originalism," for it looks to the text as it was understood by
"the ratifying public."" Yet this form of textualism escapes
bondage to the vox populi of the past by holding that the public
of the present day is free to amend the text at will. Thus, suggests Rubenfeld, the notion of ongoing tacit ratification by the
people justifies the textualist in maintaining her presentist
commitments.' Jeffrey Rosen also recognizes two sharply distinct kinds of textualist, one who asks "what the text means to
us today, without any reference to its historical context," and

61. See id. at 26 ("To the textualist, an eighteenth-century dictionary is as illegitimate as a twentieth-century Brookings pamphlet.... But a consensus is usually
available as to the common use of a particular term in a particular context.")
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
63. Rubenfeld, supra note 54, at 1103.
64. Id at 1102-03.
65. See id.; cf BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 26 ("[T]extual arguments rest on a sort
of ongoing social contract, whose terms are given their contemporary meanings continually reaffirmed by the refusal of the People to amend the instrument."); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUSt. A THEORY OF JUDIClAL REVIEW 8 (1980) ([Tihe
interpretivist [or textualist] takes his values from the Constitution, which means,
since the Constitution itself was submitted for and received popular ratification, that
they ultimately come from the people.").
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another who asks "what the text would have meant to the
people who framed and ratified it."66 Textualists on Rosen's
account are either sanguine know-nothings or grounded historians.
It is hard to recognize the Akhil Amar, or at least the whole
Amar, of The Bill of Rights in any of these restrictive definitions. As a constitutional exegete, he is too eclectic, too bent on
interpretive freedom, too alert to the multiple meanings and
potential paradoxes of open-textured language raised to the
level of principled generality, to be fairly confined to one or
another of these schools of reading. Indeed, his methods are so
inclusive as to seem at times to court inconsistency.
We should, however, be wary of drawing such a conclusion
lest the inconsistency we perceive turn out to be an illusion
projected by our own insistence on categories. On the question
of plain meaning versus recondite meaning, for example, Amar
has been criticized by Rosen for suggesting that the majority of
present-day Americans would agree that "privileges or immunities" include most of the Bill of Rights.' Detached from its
historical context, Rosen thinks, the phrase might mean precious little even to scholars. Indeed, if the Clause so clearly
contemplates the sorts of rights enumerated in the Bill, why
does Amar spend the better part of The Bill of Rights arguing
from text, history, and structure that this is the case?
The answer is that the case for which he argues is not so
simple. Like Rosen, Amar distinguishes between "the two main
strands of textualism." He notes that, "[a] plain-meaning
textualist might look to today's dictionaries to make sense of a
contested term like 'commerce' or 'cruel' or 'privileges' or 'process,' whereas an original intent textualist might look to eighteenth-century dictionaries. " ' Although both strands can be
found in The Bill of Rights, sometimes woven together, sometimes lying apart, we miss the total interpretive picture if we
keep our gaze fixed on one strand or the other. Amar in fact
practices a "third distinct approach" that he calls "intra-

66. Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1241, 1244 (1998).
67. See id. at 1244 & n.15.
68. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788-89 (1999).
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textualism." This approach "tries to use the Constitution as its
own dictionary of sorts." 9
B. Intratextualism as Therapy
To say that the Constitution, or any document, can act "as
its own dictionary" is, from a certain perspective, to speak heresy or nonsense. For if documents defined themselves, professional definers would become an endangered species, and scholars, whose job is popularly understood to involve lugging about
heavy tomes for the purpose of explaining things, would find
themselves out of a job. This view holds that complex documents cannot be judges in their own cause. They must be interpreted on the basis of exti-insic evidence, that is, by historical
events or by relevant contemporaneous documents. These are
the kinds of dogmatic assumptions that the intratextualist sets
at defiance, or at least tries to complicate.
Amar conceives of intratextualism as a therapy for what
John Hart Ely called "clause-bound" interpretation.70 Ely distinguished between narrow and broad "interpretivism,"7' defining the latter as the recognition that some content extrinsic to
a particular constitutional provision is necessary for a full understanding of that provision, and adding that "the theory one
employs to supply that content should be derived from the
general themes of the entire constitutional document and not
from some source entirely beyond its four corners."72 To draw
an analogy from a very different discipline, we might say that
fixation upon specific clauses, a practice encouraged by the
doctrinal approach to exegesis, is to constitutional interpretation
what neurosis is to mental health: a contraction of the free and
full play of faculties in the service of a misguided kind of problem-solving.7 3 The therapy for the neurosis of clause-bondage is

69. Id. at 789.
70. See ELY, supra note 65, at 12.
71. "Interpretivism" is also known as "textualism."
72. ELY, supra note 65, at 12.
73. One form of what Freud called the repetition compulsion, for example, occurs
when a patient returns again and Again in her dreams to a traumatic event, revisiting the painful moment in an effort to gain mastery over it. See SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 340 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1966);
cf SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE (1920), reprinted in THE FREUD
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broad interpretivism, or what Amar calls intratextualism.' 4
Intratextual interpretation is thus rather suggestively like intrapsychic integration, the goal of analyst and analysand working together to overcome repression. "And if they can open it at
all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or to obey?"75
This is Justice Marshall's therapy for clause-bound Article-III
judges, but the words might have been used by Doctor Freud to
exhort his patients to read and inwardly digest the meanings of
their trauma-bound unconscious.
"In deploying this technique," says Amar, "the interpreter
tries to read a contested word or phrase that appears in the
Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution
featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase." 6 This
modest how-to account of intratextualism addresses technique,
but not the theory's deeper purposes and justifications. In treating the Constitution as a kind of echo chamber, intratextualism
seeks to maximize the document's semiotic potential. More than
this, by liberating itself from clause-bondage and focusing on
"at least two clauses" together with "the link between them,"'
intratextualism forces itself to explain what that link is. The
technique is therefore about what is implicit in the document
and, by extension, in our constitutional ethos. Lacking the authoritative guidance of a discrete patch of text, the fetish of the
typical textualist, the intratextualist is compelled to think about
the Constitution and its ultimate meanings, for the ultimate
meanings of most things-theories, texts, individual lives-are
those that go unarticulated in express terms.

READER 594, 611 (Peter Gay ed., 1989) (asserting that the compulsion to repeat,
which is an act "in opposition to the pleasure principle," can be observed when "children repeat unpleasurable experiences for the . . . reason that they can master a
powerful impression far more thoroughly by being active than they could by merely
experiencing it passively").
74. Amar notes that, if Ely's "general methodological prescription is not quite
intratextualism, as I have defined it, it is rather close." Amar, supra note 68, at 779.
In particular, Amar agrees with Ely's claim that "there are indeed larger patterns
and structures implicit in the document as a whole, and that careful examination of
the entire text is the proper starting point for analysis." Id.
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). For an analysis of
Marbury as a somewhat incomplete intratextual performance, see Amar, supra note
68, at 763-66.
76. Amar, supra note 68, at 748.
77. Id. at 788.
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Moreover, this recognition of implicit meanings within noncontiguous text, which renders intratextualism more a concordance than a dictionary," involves the dichotomy of surface
and depth, or what Amar at one point refers to as "a surface
marker of a deeper analytic insight waiting to be found upon
close inspection."7 9 Thus, for example, he discovers in the word
"people," as it reverberates throughout the Constitution from
the Preamble to the Tenth Amendment, "a deep pattern, embroidering the fundamental constitutional principle of popular
sovereignty."' The advantages of reading discontinuous elements of a text as symptomatic of a deeper coherency are obvious: The technique offers the satisfaction of deriving the whole
from the part, the totality from the fragment, the urn from the
mere shard. It makes for the possibility of what Ronald
Dworkin calls "integrity" in legal interpretation, the placing of
the institutional history, in this case the Constitution and the
precedents that flow from it, in the "best" possible light.8'
Intratextualism can therefore be satisfying both aesthetically
and in political-moral terms.
These advantages of intratextualism, however, are also its
greatest potential weaknesses. For the argument from surface
to depth, from symptom to pattern, is fraught with the dangers
of subjectivity and arbitrariness. To return to the Freudian
analogy for a moment, the reliability of psychoanalysis is easily
challenged at the level of clinical interpretation of neurotic
symptoms, for the analyst typically rejects the facial evidence of
the symptom by reading it as a form of resistance, that is, as
something quite different from or even antithetical to the repressed trauma which it masks. In contrast to psychoanalysis,
of course, intratextualism benefits from the controls provided by
a more stable, rule-sensitive interpretive community (legal
scholars and lawyers) and by the comparative consensus that
results from accumulated precedent and other approved legal

78. See id. at 792-94.
79. Id. at 798. Amar's use of the term "marker" echoes semiotic theory, but in a
pre-publication draft of his article this phrase read "a surface symptom of a deeper
analytic insight waiting to be found upon close inspection"-a glance at psychoanalytic

theory. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism 74 (Oct. 15, 1998) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
80. Amar, supra note 68, at 793.
81. See RONALD DWORIN, LAW's EMPIRE 225-46 (1986).
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authorities. Amar would add, and his interpretive practice surely shows, that the conscientious intratextualist points to noncontiguous textual symptoms only as a starting point for research and analysis. This process often leads beyond the constitutional text to various forms of corroborative intertextuality, a
technique to be discussed more fully below."
The interpretive risks of intratextualism are undeniable,
however, and they increase in proportion as the resources for
inferring underlying patterns are multiplied by the intratextual
technique. That is to say, creative intratextualism substantially
augments the "class of legal reasons" that may be derived from
the Constitution. As the number of reasons or rules expands,
the number of conclusions to be drawn from the Constitution or
its parts increases also. The consequence is that intratextualism
is more likely to invite rational indeterminacy, 8 in contrast to
more staid forms of textualism which, binding analysis to specific clauses, control the number of proffered reasons and so
limit the number of conclusions that may be drawn. Quite simply, as the interpreter becomes less clause-bound, temptations
to overread may grow more numerous.
In this respect, intratextualism shares advantages and disadvantages with its near cousin, the structural approach elaborated by Charles Black. Both intratextualism and structuralism
encourage semiotic freedom and creative risk-taking. Where
Amar points to implications tucked away in noncontiguous bits
of text, Black draws inferences from the structures and relationships inhering in our constitutional system: the relationships between the federal and state governments, between citizens and governments, and among the three coordinate branches. 84 Both techniques are grounded, "unlike much
doctrinalism,

Bobbitt.

. .

. in the actual text of the Constitution," says

Indeed, the very word "structure" can refer to both

82. See Amar, supra note 68, at 771 (noting that "intratextualism often merely
provides an interpretive lead or clue, the full meaning of which will only become
apparent when other interpretive tools are also brought to bear on the problem").
83. See Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, in 1 LEGAL THEORY 481, 481 (1995)
(noting that "the law on some point is rationally indeterminate if the Class [of legal
reasons] (on some conception) is insufficient to justify only one outcome in the case").
84. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRuCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ox Bow Press 1983) (1969).
85. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 80.
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textual organization and governmental interrelationships. We
can speak, for example, of the "structure" of federalism or of
"structures" of meaning within the text of the Constitution. In
addressing one of these matters, we may soon find ourselves
touching upon the other." Thus, Amar, discussing the connection between parliamentary and individual forms of free speech,
can remark that "the extension of this right [of free speech] to
ordinary citizens in the First Amendment is indeed simply a
textual recognition of the structural truth of American popular
sovereignty." ' Here, the two kinds of argument perform such
similar functions in identifying "larger constitutional patterns at
work"' that they seem almost interchangeable.
Structuralism is not without its doubters. Black himself
pointed to the likely objection that this "new line of reasoning
will lead too far, or that its general formulas afford no ground
for prediction of results."8 9 Like intratextualism, structuralism
is vulnerable to the charge of indeterminacy, both in its methods and in its conclusions.' Yet in the hands of conscientious

86. Cf BLACK, supra note 84, at 31 ("There is . . . a close and perpetual
interworking between the textual and the relational and structural modes of*reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned are themselves created by the text, and
inference drawn from them must surely be controlled by the text.")
87. AMAR, supra note 1, at 224.
88. Amar, supra note 68, at 790. But see id. (noting that "the most typical forms
of structural argument focus not on the words of the Constitution, but rather on the
institutional arrangements implied or summoned into existence by the document"). In
the same essay, Amar distinguishes between a "brand of holistic textualism [that]
squeezes meaning from the Constitution's organization chart" and Blackian structuralism which "would point to institutional patterns rather than the organization of
constitutional text." Id. at 797 n.197. However, the similarity in methods and results
between these two approaches, even as Amar describes them here, seems to me suggestive of their proximity.
89. BLACK, supra note 84, at 48; cf BOBBITr, supra note 5, at 84 ("Structural
arguments are sometimes accused of being indeterminate because while we can all
agree on the presence of various structures, we fall to bickering when called upon to
decide whether a particular result is necessarily inferred from their relationships.").
Bobbitt's real worry about the structural approach was that it might prove to be a
technique that could be successfully employed only "by a very few," id. at 85, and
that inalienable personal rights might get lost in the elastic relation between citizen
and state. See id. at 85-86.
90. Black believed the answer to this charge was that "[n]othing but a possible
gain in predictability could come from selection of a ground which forces one to talk
about, and only about, realistic factors of national political involvement." BLACK, supra note 84, at 49. The search for the "real" grounds of decision hints at
structuralism's profound ties, in terms of motivation at least, to Legal Realism and
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and skillful practitioners, both approaches can generate more
"satisfying" results than many doctrinal arguments.9 To get a
better feel for the kinds of satisfaction that intratextualism
affords, we must look closely at some examples from The Bill of
Rights.
C. Squeezing Meaning from the Text: Amar in Action
I have already suggested that Akhil Amar's brand of
textualism seeks to maximize meaning. Indeed, on occasion, he
speaks of ways in which textualist approaches can "squeeze
more meaning from the document that inscribes our highest
and most popular law."92 This image of the determined exegete
applying digital pressure to a reluctant text both celebrates
textualism as a tool and hints at the serious purpose for which
Amar plies that tool. For when we recall that no less a figure
than Thomas Jefferson sneered at textualist efforts as "trying
what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented
against it," 93 we can appreciate the slightly defiant pride with
which Amar declares himself a squeezer of meanings.
The textual wringing that Amar describes is part of a larger
project that he calls "holistic textualism."' "Instead of being
studied holistically," he complains, "the Bill [of Rights] has been
broken up into discrete blocks of text, with each segment examined in isolation."9 5 The interpreter's goal should be "to write
in a truly comprehensive way about the Bill of Rights as a
whole," to offer an "integrated overview."" Squeezing meaning
thus stands to holism as a means to an end, a therapeutic
technique for overcoming clause-bondage. The text of the Constitution is not equivalent to the sum of its clauses, and ana-

that school's impatience with the paper rules proffered by judges. Amar's
intratextualism also bears this relation to Legal Realism, I believe, particularly in its
hostility to the frequent superficiality and wrong-headedness of doctrine. See infra
note 133 and accompanying text.
91. See BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 85.
92. Amar, supra note 68, at 826-27.
93. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 25 (quoting Justice Story's attribution of this view
to Jefferson in COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, § 407, at 390 n.1.).
94. Amar, supra note 68, at 796-98.
95. AMAR, supra note 1, at xi.
96. Id. at xii.
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lyzing it piecemeal in the received fashion will always leave a
residue of meaning unaccounted for-an irreducible gestalt. Yet
it is important to see that holism has two distinct faces in The
Bill of Rights: It is both a goal of interpretation, as we have
seen, and a goal for interpretation. That is, the act of interpreting should itself be holistic, combining various kinds of argument in a flexible, eclectic totality."
Amar's interpretive practice incorporates both dimensions of
holism. The following analysis of his discussion of the CreationEra Second Amendment is necessarily somewhat schematic and
selective, but it should serve to make visible certain important
features of his holistic textualism. Amar loses no time in stating his conclusion: The "core concerns" of both the First Amendment and the Second Amendment are "populism and federalism."" This opening gambit introduces structural concerns
with democratic self-government, and textual questions such as
the proximity of provisions, which Amar quickly harmonizes by
pointing to the intratextual echo of the Preamble's phrase "We
the People" in the main clause of the Second Amendment--the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms."9 9 Popular sovereignty thus emerges as a pattern underlying noncontiguous
instances of "the people" and their implicit relation to the populist guarantees of the First Amendment. This intratextual
move, bridging structural and textual insights, is quickly reinforced by an intertextual reference to a version of the "militia"
amendment favored by Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists. 0 Here,
intertextual difference (rather than sameness or similarity)''
makes the point about the collectivist nature of the original
Second Amendment, for the unsuccessful Pennsylvania version

97. See Amar, supra note 68, at 776 (claiming that "intratextual argument works
best when it coheres with other types of constitutional argument and is part of a

larger constitutional vision").
98. AMAR, supra note 1, at 46.
99. U.S. CoNsT. amend. II; see AMAR, supra note 1, at 47.
100. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 47.
101. Amar notes elsewhere that intratextualism can find significance in both sameness (or similarity) and difference between clauses in a document. See Amar, supra
note 68, at 761, 772; see also Amar, supra note *, at 456-57 (using an intratextual
analysis of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to show that the Act's differential use of the
words "power," "jurisdiction," and "cognizance" casts doubt on Marburys conclusion
that the Act unconstitutionally conferred original mandamus jurisdiction on the U.S.
Supreme Court). I am extending the same logic here to intertextuality.

562

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:537

included "killing game" as one of the purposes of the right to
bear arms. 2 Since this early invitation to safeguard individual rights was not picked up by the Framers, we have some evidence, Amar suggests, for concluding that the Second
Amendment contemplated only (or chiefly) collective rights at
its adoption.0 3
From structural, intratextual, and intertextual arguments,
Amar moves outside of texts altogether into history, pointing to
the connection between the revolutionary right to abolish tyrannous government and the popular appeal to arms.'" There
follows an historical account of the nineteenth-century distinction between political rights and civil rights,0 5 supplemented
by a lengthy footnote enumerating moments in American history when suffrage has been linked in some way to military
arms-bearing: further evidence that the "militia" amendment
was deeply political and collectivist in its origins. 1°' This brief
historical excursus is anchored by references to Locke's Second
Treatise of Government and the Lockean language of the Declaration of Independence. °7 Amar cites these texts, I take it, to
buttress his historical argument, not to introduce a further
intertextual argument.
Historical and intertextual arguments, however, are sometimes hard to tell apart. After all, both step outside of the text
in question to seek support from extrinsic materials, and historical data are never simply "given" but always come to us by
means of a text of some sort. 0l 8 What seems to distinguish
intertextual from historical uses of texts is that, in the former
case, the supporting text is usually of a certain significant
type,"' and it must have been capable of affecting the princi-

102. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 47.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 48-50.
106. See id. at 48-49 n.*.
107. See id. at 47.
108. "[Hlistory is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but . . . as an
absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form ... ." FREDRIC JAMESON,
THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT 35 (1981).
109. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 296 (referencing "such earlier landmarks of liberty
as the English Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and various state
constitutional declarations of rights").
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pal text in such a way as to cause the latter to "build upon" or
"deviate" from that prior text ("earlier landmarks")."' To qualify as an intertext,"' then, a text should have a certain pedigree,"' and it must bear a potentially causative. relation
to the language of the principal text.
Amar next addresses the federalism implications of the Second Amendment, probing the terms "militia" and "the people" to
determine whether the right to keep and bear arms was fundamentally a right of state governments or of citizens." 4 After a
flurry of quotations from The Federalist and Article I of the
Constituti- -i, offered primarily as historical support in the sense
described
love, Amar quotes intertextually from remarks by
Elbridge Ge-rry in the First Congress to clarify the populist, as
distinct from a states'-rights, meaning of "the people" in the

110. Id.

111. I use the term "intertext7 merely as a convenient way of referring to the
prior text.
112. Elsewhere, Amar writes of "intertextual links to other documents, such as the
English Bill of Rights, state constitutions, the Declaration of Independence, and the
m
Articles of Confederation.
" Amar, supra note 68, at 799. The phrasing suggests that
this list may be nonexhaustive but also that intertexts should be documents of sufficient constitutional weight to have had an impact on the Framers. It is with some
uncertainty, therefore, that in my discussion below I refer to Elbridge Gerry's remarks in the First Congress as an intertext, just as earlier I suggested that an
amendment proposed by the Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists could be an intertext. Yet
such remarks were a kind of prior "text" (since voiced in a central speaking spot and
placed on record) and were of sufficient weight to play a role in the deliberations of
the Framers of the Second Amendment.
113. The precise nature of this causative role is unclear, however. To qualify as an
intertext, must a prior text actually have "influenced" the Framers, impacting upon
their "intentions," or is it sufficient that it merely could have had such an impact? Is
influence upon individuals necessary at all? Might a document function as an
intertext if it simply offers evidence of contemporaneous usage? If so, could the candidate text have been written two years after the Bill of Rights?
These questions touch on the vexed problem of historical causation: whether
two events stand to each other in a relation of causation or mere parallelism. Amar
is in various ways (though not exclusively) an original-intent textualist, but his methodology seems flexible enough to make use of (some) parallel as well as causal
intertexts. Yet I take it that his flexibility would not stretch so far as to allow him
to abandon all traditional criteria of influence and causation, as some poststructuralist and postmodern writers have seemed willing to do. See, e.g., MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS at xiii (1973) (discussing his archaeological or
"epistemic" approach to knowledge and noting that he considers "the traditional explanations-spirit of the time, technological or social changes, influences of various
kinds" to be unsatisfactory and so has "left the problem of causes to one side").
114. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 51.
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Second Amendment's main clause."' Amar reinforces this
meaning intratextually by pointing to the Tenth Amendment's
clear distinction between "the States" and "the people.""' He
also brings contemporaneous lexical evidence to bear upon "militia," as he later does with "army," 17 to show that two hundred years ago "militia," standing alone without adjective,
meant a communal muster of "the people," not a band of paid,
semiprofessional volunteers."' This argument from contemporaneous usage, frequently associated with the opinion-writing of
Justice Scalia, "' is perhaps the paradigmatic textualist strategy, what Amar calls "original intent" textualism." ° Contemporaneous dictionaries or lexicons, because they satisfy neither
generic nor causal criteria, and because they are not really
"texts," would not seem to qualify as intertexts, although they
can often be as persuasive as intertexts and do offer suggestive
parallelism. Indeed, because they report consensus of usage
rather than simply contain single uses of words, dictionaries
might be 2 thought to carry more interpretive weight than
intertexts.1 1

Having argued for the populist tenor of the Second
Amendment's main clause, and having parried a states'-rights
reading of "well regulated" by means of historical and
intertextual (state constitutional) arguments, 2 Amar turns to
the rich intratextual collaboration between the Amendment and
Clauses 12, 15, and 16 of Article I, which collectively allocate
control of local militias between the central government and the
states, and sharply distinguish "Armies" from "the Militia."'"
Amar follows up this intratextual argument with a colorful

115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 53.
118. See id. at 51-52.
119. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (using an 1828
edition of Webster's American Dictionary to argue that the Framers of the Eighth
Amendment did not intend "cruel and unusual punishments" to refer to disproportionate punishments).
120. Amar, supra note 68, at 789.
121. Cf id. at 792 (discussing the comparative strengths and weaknesses of using
a standard dictionary, as opposed to the Constitution itself, as a "database of word
usage").
122. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 52-53.
123. See id. at 53-54.
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depiction of the civic virtues of the militia as contrasted with
the ragtag mercenary character of standing armies, using historical argument to flesh out his larger structural point about
the role of the militia in protecting "liberty through localism."" As with religious establishment, the Bill of Rights
leaves conscription and militia control to state and local levels,
checking, or narrowly confining, the power of the central government to interfere with those traditional prerogatives."
In the course of laying down all these textual and historical
coordinates, Amar has subtly defined the Second Amendment's
militia as a populist institution that can be neither reduced to
individual rights nor generalized to states' rights. It is an intermediate association, a vehicle through which individuals participate in government.'26 Amar now proceeds to his finale-an argument against federal power to institute a national
army draft-by pointing to the phrase "a well-regulated militia ...

[being] 'necessary to the security of a free State,'" and

by balancing that phrase intratextually against the
Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause to suggest that the
pointed echo of "necessary" in the Bill of Rights "estops" Congress from ever claiming that what is "necessary" is an army of
conscripts."7 Historical argument follows, with an account of
various federal draft bills introduced during the War of 1812
and their defeat at the hands of representatives of the New
England states who vigorously opposed federal interference with
the militia."2 Amar concludes his historical polemic by remarking, significantly, that the defeat of these early draft bills
"should be as central a precedent for our Second Amendment as
the 1800 triumph over the Sedition Act is for our First."129
The significance of this remark for an analysis of Amar's
interpretive practice lies in its startling normative suggestion
that early-nineteenth-century legislative activity should serve as
a "precedent" in our constitutional jurisprudence. Pivoting on
this proposal, Amar introduces, by way of exasperated epilogue,

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 55-56.
See id. at 56.
See id. at xii.
Id. at 57 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II).
See id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58.
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a doctrinal argument focusing on the Supreme Court's upholding of a federal draft in the Selective Draft Law Cases of
1918."' Forced to follow the structural and textual tour de
force of the preceding pages, doctrine makes an unsurprisingly
poor showing here, and Amar drives the point home by noting
that the Selective Draft Law Cases exhibit scant sympathy with
"the worldview that gave rise" to the Second Amendment.13 1
With this thrust, Amar levels one of the gravest criticisms that,
in his view, can be made of a constitutional argument-that it
is anachronistic. And this Court decision is anachronistic in two
temporal directions: It makes no effort to understand the world
of 1800, and it fails to articulate the vast historical changes
since 1800 that might well justify a national draft in 1918. In
remarking that "[a] case can be right for the wrong reasons, "132 Amar offers a glimpse of his distant kinship with the
Legal Realists, who often complained that judges proffered
abstract rules and rationales in place of the real reasons (frequently having to do with contemporary economic forces) that
shaped their decisions.'33
Amar's treatment of the Selective Draft Law Cases is
paradigmatic of his use of doctrine in The Bill of Rights. Typically, judicial precedent arrives late in his arguments and puts
on a blundering, misguided, or simply irrelevant performance at
that point. Amar is forthright about the subordinate role of doctrine in his book, noting with acid understatement that "judges
are not exactly the heroes and heroines of my tale."134 This
should not be surprising in a work that foregrounds textual and
historical argument, often as a corrective for the obfuscations of
judicial opinions that have paid precious little attention to text
and history.

130. 245 U.S. 366 (1918); see AMAR, supra note 1, at 58-59.
131. AMAR, supra note 1, at 59.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS
STUDY 59 (Oceana Publications 1960) (1930) ("It is society and not the courts which
gives rise to, which shapes in the first instance the emerging institution; which kicks
the courts into action."); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (pt. 2), 14
A.BA. J. 159, 159 (1928) (discussing courts' "intuition of fitness of solution to problem" as manifested in decisions concerning promises not to compete, together with the
"[clontemporary economic reality [that] made these holdings
eminently sound");
see also supra note 90.
134. AMAR, supra note 1, at 305.
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As Amar himself points out, however, precedent plays a more
central and often a more positive role in Part Two of The Bill
of Rights, where cases like Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,'35
Corfield v. Coryell,'3 6 and even Dred Scott v. Sandford "
offer language that helps to illuminate-at times intertextually
or historically-the Reconstructors' intentions in framing the
Fourteenth Amendment." 8 In Amar's account of the reconstructed Second Amendment, for example, doctrine combines
with sustained historical argument and intertextual invocations
of Blackstone, the Freedman's Bureau Act, and other sources, to
demonstrate the Fourteenth Amendment's subtle "privatization"
of the Creation-Era's collectivist right to bear arms.'3 9 Curiously, it is not a judicial opinion but the National Rifle Association ("NRA") that appears in the role of anachronistic latecomer
here, for the NRA has made the individual right to own arms
its rallying cry, while offering Creation-Era collectivist rationales for its position.'40 In effect, the NRA ignores the historical truth that "between 1775 and 1866 the poster boy of arms
morphed
from the Concord minuteman to the Carolina freed141
man."
To sum up, Akhil Amar's holistic textualism seeks to extract
the maximum amount of constitutional significance from the
Bill of Rights by means of a diverse and comprehensive exegesis. Of Philip Bobbitt's five types of argument, Amar employs
three with regularity-the textual, the historical, and the structural-while using doctrinal arguments more selectively and
often for the purpose of pointing a moral about judicial inattentiveness to history and text. Freely mixing these types, Amar
vividly illustrates the concept of the "archetype," a term that
may be preferable to "type," Bobbitt observes, "since many arguments take on aspects of more than one type."'42 I have already suggested that Amar might be thought of as a "hyper-

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
(1846),
140.
141.
142.

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (Washington, Circuit J.).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
See AMAR, supra note 1, at 128-29, 140-45, 170-72, 176-78.
See id. at 260-64 (citing Dred Scott, Barron, and Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243
for various propositions).
See id. at 266.
Id.
BOBBITr, supra note 5, at 7.

568

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:537

textualist," a term currently used to indicate the multi-media
capabilities of CD-ROM text presentations. A hypertext typically
contains one or more versions of some classic text (Moby Dick
or The Odyssey, for example) and permits the user to access a
wealth of historical, biographical, intertextual, or other annotative material by clicking on portions of the document. Providing
a searchable text that serves as its own concordance and thus
offers unlimited opportunities for intratextual exploration, the
hypertext maximizes meaning by keying intrinsic and extrinsic
research materials to relevant parts of the text. Amar's methodology is analogous in many ways.
Textual arguments, in intratextual and intertextual forms,
predominate in The Bill of Rights. In that respect, Suzanna
Sherry is surely correct in calling Amar a "committed
textualist."'
His eclectic use of argument types, however,
renders suspect Sherry's further claim that "his dedication to
textualism as the only valid interpretive method deprives him
of the ability to stand back and ask whether his results make
sense." 45 Amar is far less theory-driven and much more flexibly pragmatic than Sherry allows. Through the Ray-Bans of a
committed doctrinalist, however, Amar might well appear to be
methodologically monochromatic.
Finally, as Amar's analysis shifts from Creation to Reconstruction, intertextual arguments begin to outnumber
intratextual ones. This trend would appear to be inevitable in
light of the central task of Part Two: demonstrating how the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
subtly incorporates the Bill of Rights against the states. For
although the Constitution's Habeas and Comity Clauses 46
allow Amar to make certain important intratextual147 argu-

143. Cf Amar, supra note 68, at 788 ("In effect, intratextualists read a two-dimensional parchment in a three-dimensional way, carefully folding the parchment to bring
scattered clauses alongside each other.").
144. Suzanna Sherry, Textualism and Judgment, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1148,
1149 (1998).
145. Id. at 1152.
146. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
147. Significantly, perhaps, Jeffrey Rosen refers to the relationship between the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Comity Clause as "intertextual," not
intratextual, suggesting that he regards the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment as quite separate texts. See Rosen, supra note 66, at 1246.
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ments about the kinds of rights contemplated by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, these arguments are limited in scope
and require 'supplementation by doctrinal evidence. 4 ' The
Reconstructors' use of "words like privileges and immunities
that are only roughly synonymous with, rather than identical
to, the words of the first eight amendments"
creates difficulties for the intratextualist's project. Synonymity's displacement of verbal identity alters the acoustics of the intratextual
echo chamber. Unable to call attention to precise repetitions
reverberating between portions of the constitutional text, the
interpreter must devise strategies of translation. Amar's technique of refined incorporation makes ample use of intertextual,
historical, and doctrinal sources to translate or mediate between
the Creation Framers' list of specific rights and the
Reconstructors' generalized "privileges or immunities."
Indeed, even if there existed a greater number of echoes
between the Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment, the two acts
of framing, separated by seventy-five years of American history,
might well render the relationship between those echoes
intertextual rather than intratextual. However organic we may
believe the total constitutional instrument to be, history has
introduced various kinds and degrees of discontinuity into the
whole, recasting the document as a series-of texts that we must
continually synthesize in that ultimate constitutional moment,
the interpretive present.'5 ° This, after all, is what refined incorporation is all about.

148. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 174-78 (reading the Comity Clause and Justice
Bushrod Washington's ode to fundamental rights in Corfield v. Coryel as intertexts
for understanding Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
149. Id. at 174.
150. My argument here runs the risk, of course, of reintroducing the clause-bound
approach to the Constitution at the level of historical justification. It is clear that
Amar considers the Constitution and the original Bill to be an organic whole: "How
could we forget that our Constitution is a single document, and not a jumble of disconnected phrases-that it is a Constitution we are expounding?" Id. at 125. My point
is merely that history inevitably raises the specter of discontinuity even though it
may not create utter disconnection within our project of democratic self-government,
which Rubenfeld characterizes as "living under temporally extended, self-given commitments." Rubenfeld, supra note 54, at 1106. Temporally extended projects are, by
definition, exposed to the ravages of time.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETICS
A. Textualist Poetics: Amar's Interpretive Practice

No one who has encountered the language of literary criticism can read The Bill of Rights and not be struck by Amar's
frequent appeals to aesthetic values, to the felicities of the
constitutional text and the drama of its framing. It is "poetic,"
he says, that the original First Amendment addressed the
structural matter of Congressional representation, for in this
way the Amendment responded to perhaps the chief concern of
the Anti-Federalists. 5 ' Similarly, the "populist roots" of our
First Amendment-Madison's third-were vindicated when the
election of 1800 tossed out the Federalists who had passed the
self-dealing Alien and Sedition Acts-an event that "borders on
the poetic," says Amar.'52
But Amar's use of aesthetic rhetoric goes beyond mere casual
characterizations of events and texts. Indeed, no account of his
methodology and practice can ignore this rhetoric, for his
intratextual analyses presuppose a kind of organic self-awareness in the Constitution's language that is most often associated with the intensity of poetry. The exalted generality of the
Bill of Rights, like the language of great literature, is "charged
with meaning to the utmost possible degree."'53 The Bill's dignified limpidity makes it the People's Poem, lofty but learnable
and ennobling. In leading us to see how that Poem instructs,
Amar does not want us to lose sight of how it can delight as
well.
He urges, for example, that
the First Amendment's words that these freedoms and
rights [of expression, assembly, and petition] "shall" not be

"abridg[ed]" by "law" perfectly harmonize with their echoes

151. AMAR, supra note 1, at 9.

152. Id. at 23.
153. EzRA POUND, ABC OF READING 22 (1934). William 0. Douglas spoke of the
Constitution's language as being charged not with meaning but with power: "Words
are sparingly used; and often a single phrase contains a vast arsenal of power. ...
[The Commerce Clause] is the fount and origin of vast power. It has exerted as great
an impact on the American economy as any power, apart from the War Power." WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 192 (1956).
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in the key sentence of section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment]. That harmony is no accident; the key sentence was
drafted to resonate with the nonabridgment clause of the
First Amendment.'5
He also speaks of "the rhetorical resonance between the phrase
'No State shall' [in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment]
and the idea of a federally enforceable 'bill of rights' against
state governments [in Article I, Section 10]."' 55 Madison, we
are told, had "intuited" this "resonance" in his own proposed
amendment "that 'No State shall' abridge various rights of
religion, expression, and jury trial."'5 6 Similarly, John Jay's
remarks in 1778 deprecating the taking of civilian property for
military use "resonate with the special fears of an overweening
and unaccountable federal military audible in the Second and
Third Amendments."'5 7 Indeed, once we are attuned to the
harmonies and resonances that Amar wishes us to hear, we
begin to suspect that when he says that a certain phrase or
provision "sounds in structure" (or in federalism), 5 ' he is
alerting us to tonal values and aural pleasures, not just
adapting the old lawyer's tag about an action sounding in
damages.'5 9
Similarly, Amar draws our attention to "the obvious harmony" between an early amendment put forward by Madison and
the wording of our Fourth Amendment, a resonance that "fits
snugly" with a "more satisfying account" of the Fourth Amend-

154. AMAR, supra note 1, at 232 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
155. Id. at 164.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 80.
158. Id. at 20.
159. Cf BLACK, supra note 84, at 11 (expressing a preference for a legal ground
"sounding in the structure of federal union"); id. at 69 (referring to "reasons sounding
deeper in political symbolism"). Black's use of "sounding" strikes me as more logical
and legal and less aural in its connotations than Amar's. It is perhaps worth pointing
out, with respect to Amar's aesthetic language, that he has been influenced by
Black's style as well as by his ideas. After quoting extensively from the legislative
history of the Thirty-ninth Congress, for example, Amar quips, "As a lover of mercy ...
I shall resist the temptation to present all the evidence that antiincorporationists have overlooked or distorted." AMAR, supra note 1, at 186. Compare
Black's droll confession to his Baton Rouge audience that "[i]f I were not a lover of
mercy, I could have prepared myself to spend all three of these lectures discoursing
on the variant theories of the various justices in New York V. Miln and the Passenger
Cases alone." BLACK, supra note 84, at 20.
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ment. 16 0 He stresses the harmonies between the populist language of that text and the role of the civil jury in redressing
unreasonable searches. 16' The Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause, Amar. notes a few pages later, "did harmonize with the
original Bill of Rights' underlying vision of federalism." 62 "The
jury," he reminds us in language typical of the poetry or music
critic, "was the dominant motif of Amendments V-VIII.""
And, coming at the end of the original Bill, "the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments elegantly integrate popular sovereignty
with federalism."" These examples and those in the foregoing
paragraph show that intratextual, intertextual, structural, and
historical arguments all become candidates for aesthetic characterization in The Bill of Rights.
As Amar proceeds from the Creation Era to the Reconstruction Era, and as intratextual insights begin to make way for
intertextual and historical arguments, aesthetic metaphors
become rarer as ways of characterizing the constitutional text,
and metallurgic figures take center stage. Harmonies, resonances, echoes, and motifs ebb away; the shore is strewn with
ores, filters, and crucibles, and we hear the din of mining, refining, forging, molding, and recasting. As Amar's narrative
moves from the Revolutionary Period to the Industrial Age,
technology displaces art as the controlling metaphor for his
methodology. As I have suggested in other connections, this
rhetorical transition is necessitated by the very different task
that confronts the textualist interpreter of the Fourteenth
Amendment, an Amendment dislocated from the earlier constitutional text by the modifications of language and the transformations of history. The exegete who was able to savor the
chamber music of the original Bill of Rights must now labor to
translate the dissonant chords of the Civil War amendments to
make them harmonize with the rest. Refined incorporation
requires hard work and an interpretive technology; aesthetic
sensitivity to resonances will no longer suffice.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

AMAR, supra note 1, at 73.
See id.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 123.
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B. The Constitutionalistas New Critic
"[I]ntratextualism," Amar says, "has a certain undeniable
aesthetic attraction, appealing to ideals of symmetry and harmony. When done well, intratextualism is elegant. The use of
linguistic links to trace thematic threads is a common feature
of aesthetically pleasing interpretation of great works of literature, for example."1" Elsewhere, he speaks in praise of "snug
interpretation, a particularly well-fitting, aesthetically pleasing,
illuminating interpretation."166 Again, I perceive a parallel-and I suspect a debt-to Charles Black, who said of his
own structural method that "I am expressing here an aesthetic
and moral preference, though aesthetic and moral choices may
have their effect, ultimately, in practice as well."" Black
carefully qualifies his aesthetic enthusiasm, making sure his
audience does not take him for a dilettante, by pointing to the
role that aesthetic values may play, "ultimately," in "practice."
This pragmatic appeal to moderation strikes me as very close to
Amar's attitude towards constitutional interpretation: The Constitution may delight as well as instruct, but it "is not and
should not become a mere objet d'art."'
While Black, Bobbitt, and others have helped him to recognize a role for the aesthetic in constitutional exegesis, Amar
has also been influenced, I believe, by the theory and practice
of the New Criticism, a loosely confederated school of literary
critics that gained prominence in the American academy in the
1940s and 1950s, and remained a powerful pedagogic force well
into the 1970s and beyond. The New Critics revolutionized
literary teaching and scholarship and scandalized their academic elders by holding that literary texts themselves-especially
complex poems of the lyric genre-should be the primary focus
of study, not biographical or historical contexts that merely
provided external frameworks for thinking about these texts.
For the New Critic, the language of literature had a special
claim on the student's attention, for it offered an intensity and

165.
166.
167.
168.

Amar, supra note 68, at 799.
Amar, supra note 53, at 1659.
BLACK, supra note 84, at 28.
Amar, supra note 68, at 799.
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richness and a deeply unified structure of meanings that surpassed the comparatively utilitarian discursiveness of most
other forms of writing.
Cleanth Brooks, perhaps the most celebrated of the New
Critics, spoke of "the 'beauty' of the poem considered as a
whole" and "the effect of [its] total pattern."'6 9 The emphasis
on wholeness and unity was characteristic: "[This] principle of
unity which informs [the structure of a poem] seems to be one
of balancing and harmonizing connotations, attitudes, and
meanings." 170 "It is a positive unity, not a negative; it represents not a residue but an achieved harmony." 7' A poem is
like "a ballet or musical composition" for it is "a pattern of
resolutions and balances and harmonizations developed through
a temporal scheme."'7 2 One of the goals of the critic is "to see
that the parts of a poem are related to each other organically,
and related to the total theme indirectly." 7' Robert Penn
Warren wrote that the poet "proves his vision by submitting it
to the fires of irony-to the drama of his structure-in the hope
that the fires will refine it."
The complex text commends
itself to our scrutiny as a "verbal icon"' 75 -a cynosure of our
quasi-religious ardors, a focal point for critical thought, a repository of densely packed meanings.
The New Critical values are well inventoried by Brooks and
Warren in the preceding paragraph: wholeness, totality of pattern, resolution, balance, harmonization, organicism, and structure. If we turn back for a moment to the values that Amar in
his intratextual moments associates with the constitutional text,
we encounter a very similar list: holistic textualism, wholeness,
integrated overview, harmony, resonance, echo, motif, structure

169. Cleanth Brooks, The Heresy of Paraphrase, in THE WELL WROUGHT URN
(1947), reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY SINCE PLATO 1033, 1033 (Hazard Adams ed.,
1st ed. 1971) [hereinafter CRITICAL THEORY].
170. Id., reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at 1034.
171. Id., reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at 1034.
172. Id., reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at 1037.
173. Cleanth Brooks, Irony as a Principle of Structure, in LITERARY OPINION IN
AMERICA (M.D. Zobel ed., 1951), reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at
1041, 1042.
174. Robert Penn Warren, Pure and Impure Poetry, in SELECTED ESSAYS (1958), reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at 981, 992.
175. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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(in textual and institutional senses). Moreover, Amar subscribes
to a view of authorial intention entirely in keeping with that of
the New Critics, who attacked what they called the "intentional
fallacy." Intentional fallacy is the notion that poetic language
can and should be traced to identifiable authorial intentions
despite the reality that "the design or intention of the author is
neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the
success of a work of literary art."76 Writing of the Constitution, Amar similarly asserts that the "deep pattern[s]" revealed
by intratextual analysis "may not have been specifically intended" by the Framers, though these patterns are "far from random."'77 "A great play," he says in a quintessentially New
Critical moment, "may contain a richness of meaning beyond
what was clearly in the playwright's mind when the muse
came; ordinary language contains depths of association that not
even our best poets fully understand, even as they intuit."78
If we must point to a source for these profound patterns that
defy all manner of explanation, Amar says, we should attribute
them to "the genius of the document." 79 The constitutional
verbal icon, the Framers' well-wrought urn, exists independently of specific provenances and intentions; the document that
offers up truths about our national identity need not divulge its
more mundane secrets.
Yet, for all of Amar's affinities with the New Critics, he does
not share their valorizing of linguistic irony, dissonance, tension, and paradox. 80 These values, considered by Brooks and

176. W.K. Wimsatt & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in THE VERBAL ICON (1954), reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at 1015, 1015.
177. Amar, supra note 68, at 793.

178. Id. at 793-94.
179. Id. at 794.
180. Nor does he share their reluctance to make use of historical argument. Jeffrey

Rosen has compared one kind of constitutional textualist to "New Critics" who "ask
what the text means to us today, without any reference to its historical context.'

Rosen, supra note 66, at 1244. This is the received view of New Criticism, and it is
more a caricature than an accurate depiction. The New Critics did not reject historical context wholesale, and they regularly consulted the historical meanings of words.
Yet it is true that, having rescued the study of poetry from dry-as-dust historiography, they trained their spotlight on the text and kept historical analysis in the
wings. See generally FRANK LENTRICCHIA, AFTER THE NEW CRITICISM (1980). In this
respect, Amar, who makes ample use of historical argument, departs dramatically

from his New Critical forbears-a further illustration of the eclectic nature of his
textualism.
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Warren to be the hallmarks of complex texts, do not find their
way into Amar's intratextual theory and practice. Amar provides some distinctions that may shed light on this divergence:
A great historian or deconstructionist might approach a
great text in search of irony, polyphony, and even contradiction.... A great literary critic or classicist might read a
text so as to reveal its artistic beauty. ... A great lawyer

or judge reading the Constitution as law will look for something slightly different: consistency rather than inconsistency, workability and ease of exposition to ordinary Americans
rather than sheer beauty in the eyes of aesthetes. 8'
Amar reveals several things indirectly in this important passage. First, he implicitly dissociates himself from Critical Legal
Studies, or what he refers to as a "deconstructionist" approach.
Yet the reasons he gives face in two directions. Although forms
of "irony, polyphony, and ...

contradiction" can indeed be

found in post-structuralist-tinged CLS accounts of the radical
indeterminacy of legal rules, 82 these qualities are actually
more characteristic of New Critical celebrations of the ironic
textures of complex works."s Amar is really dissociating himself from negative or suspicious hermeneutics in general, a category that might be seen as including both New Criticism in its
irony-exalting moments and deconstruction, which in its American avatar has been influenced by the New Critics. Ultimately,
there is little room in Amar's project for irony, contradiction,
and indeterminacy, because his purpose is to build consensus
about how the Constitution coheres and how it hangs together
as an instrument of popular sovereignty. When he does encounter dissonance in the text-as in the verbal nonidentity of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause with the Bill of Rights-he
works to overcome the obstacle through strategies of translation
and textual refinement. Amar's is a constructive, not a
deconstructive, vision.

181.
182.
tation.
183.

Amar, supra note 68, at 794.
Amar cites Duncan Kennedy in the portion of the text omitted from my quoSee id.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Amar the textualist, if he is to be found anywhere in his own
list of interpretive types, is probably closest (ironically perhaps)
to the "lawyer or judge" who seeks in the Constitution "consistency... workability and ease of exposition to ordinary Americans.""' In a related context, he has confessed to being "a
constitutionalist, a textualist, and a populist.""M The emphasis
here is on pragmatism, accessibility, and consistency, on the
relationship between the constitutional text and the people, not
on the cognac-and-smoking-jacket pleasures of the aesthetic
voluptuary.
Ultimately, the siren song of art is incompatible with the
dimension of constitutional interpretation that involves legal
advocacy. Advocacy is a deeply purposive act; its goals are utilitarian and external. The tendency of art, on the other hand, is
internal and purposeless; "poetry makes nothing happen."" s
At most, aesthetic experience, the perception of beauty, harmonizes the human faculties, mediates between appetitive drives
and intellectual purposes, and reconciles our animal and rational natures. 87 Art stands aside from the bustle and clamor of
the human comedy; it is, as Immanuel Kant explained,
purposiveness without purpose,18 self-sufficient and unperturbed. It delivers us from "the slavery of the will."'89 This, of
course, is a Romantic view of aesthetics, and it is one deeply
shared by the New Critics. Legal argument, however much it
may be assisted by aesthetic sensibility, cannot depend upon
art for its essence. The lawyer or legal scholar seeks to persuade; she wills change in the workaday world. Constitutional
arguments, whether they proceed from text, history, structure,
doctrine, prudential purpose, or democratic ethos, are argu184. Amar, supra note 68, at 794.
185. Amar, supra note 53, at 1657.
186. W.H. Auden, In Memory of W.B. Yeats, in SELECTED POEMS 80, 82 (Edward
Mendelson ed., 1979). Clearly, this attitude towards the function of art differs from

that of social realists of the 1930s and Berkeley poets of the 1960s.
187. See FRIEDRICH VON SCHILLER, LETTERS ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF
MAN (1795), reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at 418, 418-31.
188. See IMANUEL KANT, Analytic of the Beautiful, in CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT
(1790), reprinted in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at 379, 390.
189. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA (1819), reprinted in
CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 169, at 476, 478.
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ments. They are purposiveness incarnate. Aesthetic argument,
in Philip Bobbitt's sense, would be a contradiction in terms.
Aesthetic values can be a tributary to other argument types,
but they cannot themselves become part of what he calls "our
legal grammar."190 They are in that respect exempted from
constitutional fate.
Amar's intratextual use of aesthetic terminology, however, is
far from empty rhetoric. "[A]rtistic beauty"-the desideratum of
the "critic or classicist" in Amar's taxonomy of interpreters-is
not irrelevant to his project, even if that project resists the
seductions of "sheer beauty." 9 ' Art's constitutional fate is to
remain the handmaiden of textual interpretation. Its role is
subservient, but not servile. For Amar, the Constitution is the
People's Poem; its formal beauties testify to the deep patterns
of popular sovereignty that emerge over time, both in our collective commitment to the temporally extended project of republican government and in the private, timebound labors of the
committed textualist.

190. BOBBrIT, supra note 5, at 6.

191. Amar, supra note 68, at 794.

